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Abstract. This paper aims to analyse the Moroccan tax potential compared to a sample of 
countries (panel), relying on the tax effort concept, wich allows isolating the part of the 
government public levying. It is an international study, using a panel data (25 countries-26 
years). The result of econometrics estimations shows the positive effect of the GDP per 
capita, the openness degree of the economy, the monetization degree and the part of 
industrial Added Value on the public potential while the part of agricultural Added Value 
had a negative impact. Analyzing the tax effort, we find that Morocco had a negative effort 
between 1990 and 2004. But, since 2005, the policies pursued after the reform helped 
reverse the trend to achieve a positive effort. It means that Morocco exploits all his fiscal 
resources from the standard of the sample. 
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1. Introduction 
he government ensures its sovereign missions by offering public goods in 
the best conditions of efficiency. It is also responsible for implementing 
conjunctural stabilization policies. Finally, it must promote equity through 
redistributive policies. 
The expenditures required to finance public goods, such as spending on 
infrastructure, education and health services, are covered through several modes of 
funding: tax, internal and external borrowing, donations for the most poorer and 
finally, seigniorage recipes. The tax is causing increasing economic distortions 
with its level; the distortions also vary according to the structure of the public levy. 
The solvency condition of public finances requires the counterpart of borrowing of 
future public revenues. Donations depend on decisions made by the international 
community. Finally, seigniorage revenues can generate inflation. 
Public finance managers have to identify the best possible combination between 
the various means of financing public goods. Given the constraints on donations 
and seigniorage resources and also the need to use future tax resources to mobilize 
borrowing in a sustainable way, taxation is a preferred means (Brun, Chambas, & 
Combes, 2006) to cover public expenditure. Except that the use of taxation must 
respect the teachings of the theory of optimal taxation. 
The theory of optimal taxation involves analyzing the efficiency-equity tradeoff 
that a government faces. The logical path to determining the best tax system is 
threefold (Simula, 2011). First, it is important to agree on the objectives pursued by 
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the public decision-maker. The next step is to examine the different means of 
achieving the ends pursued, taking into account the various material, institutional 
or informational constraints. Finally, it remains to identify the best feasible 
solution, one that best satisfies the objectives within the set of possibilities. We 
thus follow the approach advocated by Mirrlees, one of the founders of the modern 
theory of optimal taxation, "A good way of governing is to agree upon objectives, 
discover what is possible, and optimize" (Mirrlees, 1986; Simula, 2011). 
Mastering the potential of tax resources is crucial for good tax policy planning. 
Indeed, the fiscal potential informs the political authorities of the economy's 
capacity to finance public expenditure autonomously. Morocco, a mainly tax-based 
country, on average, over the period 2000-2015, 88% of its revenue is tax revenue, 
has undertaken a set of tax reforms in recent years to make the most of the potential 
for public resources and improve the level of government revenue. 
What are the factors likely to influence the tax potential? By conducting an 
econometric estimation test of this potential, based on panel data, this article 
proposes to provide answers to this question. After a short presentation of the 
general context of the theory of optimal taxation, a synthetic review on the tax 
potential where we expose the analysis methodology, then we proceed to the 
estimation and the interpretation of the results. 
 
2. General context of the theory of optimal taxation 
The theory of optimal taxation is currently the theoretical base most often used 
or cited to study the properties of a tax system. Its theoretical project is aimed at 
normative purposes in order to describe the optimal configuration of a tax system 
by relying on the maximization of a "macro" social welfare function. The authors 
of this school of thought have often put forward its filiation with the reference 
work of Musgrave: The theory of public finance published in 1959 (Beleau, 2013). 
Musgrave (Beleau, 2013), in his reference book, believes in another vision of 
the economy. He thinks from his first chapter that modern capitalism is a mixed 
economy and that an important public sector is indispensable in a market economy. 
He admits, of course, that the distribution of income is to a large extent determined 
by the ownership of the factors of production and their remuneration on the market. 
At the same time, a significant portion of the national product must be devoted to 
collective needs. The state budget therefore significantly influences the private 
sector through taxes and public transfers. In addition, fiscal policy affects the level 
of employment and prices in the private sector. The economic system described by 
Musgrave is thus mixed, and a large and indispensable public sector coexists with 
the market economy. Therefore, Musgrave (Beleau, 2013) defines the modalities of 
the intervention of the State by emphasizing the multidimensional character of the 
fiscal policy: 
 Provision of public goods and services; 
 Increase or not the redistribution of income in the economy with the aim of 
reducing inequalities; 
 Need for “automatic stabilizers” to counteract the negative impact of an 
exogenous shock. 
All of these dimensions are brought together by Musgrave in three branches of 
government activity (Beleau, 2013):  
* The function of allocation of resources, aiming to reestablish an optimal use 
of resources in the Pareto sense, as the free functioning of the markets deviates 
from this objective. For example, it may be to combat negative externalities 
through the production of public goods and services.  
* The distribution function aimed at modifying the initial distribution of income 
and wealth according to the aspirations of society. The introduction of a 
progressive tax is, for example, a solution to a more equitable redistribution of 
income.  
* The stabilization function, for its part, must play the role of "regulator" of the 
economy, that is to say, maintain price stability and ensure the full use of factors of 
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production. This function is part of the continuity of Keynesian thought as well as 
in the economic context of the time Musgrave wrote.  
From this brief presentation of Musgrave, there is a desire to give the state and 
governments a margin of maneuver in the conduct of economic policy to meet the 
three objectives already mentioned. Musgrave does not hide his preference for 
economic regulation instruments, especially of the Keynesian type. This is also the 
statement of most economists who defend the theory of optimal taxation. 
 
3. Tax potential analysis: a literature review 
The major challenges dealing in particular with the fight against poverty and the 
major needs for basic infrastructure in a context of sluggish international economic 
conditions are leading public authorities in developing countries to seek to increase 
their resources further. It is in this context that the question of assessing the tax 
potential has long been the subject of particular attention. The fiscal potential of an 
economy is the ratio of the tax revenue that an economy can generate if it uses all 
its resources and capacity to collect it (Alfirman, 2003). Thus, the gap between the 
fiscal potential and the tax revenue actually collected is the fiscal effort. 
The assessment of tax revenues and the analysis of their determinants generally 
pose methodological problems. These methodological difficulties stem in part from 
the fact that a part of the tax revenue of the countries may be due to the 
implementation of economic policies while another part may be the result of the 
evolution of a set of structural factors characterizing country (Brun et al., 2006). 
Faced with these difficulties, a solution proposed by Stosky & Worldermariam 
(1997) aims to evaluate the tax effort by isolating the effect of economic policy on 
tax mobilization; the difference between the actual level of fiscal resources and the 
structural level determined by a set of structural factors such as the level of 
development, the sectoral origin of income and the degree of monetarization of the 
economy is then used. 
In the literature, the methods of assessing the fiscal potential found are based 
mainly on estimates based on panel data. This methodology was used by Brun, 
Chambas & Gurineau (2007) for two different samples; the former includes 121 
developing and transition countries, while the latter only includes developing 
countries (99). They showed that the levy rate is higher than imports and the share 
of mining and oil exports is high. On the other hand, the share of agricultural 
production in total production tends to decrease the public levy. The impact of per 
capita income is also positive, but it is less robust than that of the other variables, 
since it is no longer significant in the sample comprising only DCs. Indeed, the 
exclusion of transition countries from the sample increases the weight of the 
countries of Latin America - the richest within this group and structurally less than 
the African countries. 
Chambas & Brun (2010) used the same method for the case of Senegal. They 
found that GDP per capita lagged behind, the share of the agricultural sector in 
GDP and the share of mining exports in total exports negatively affect the fiscal 
potential, while the impact of the import rate on GDP and the share of oil exports 
in total exports is positive. The study also showed that Senegal's level of revenue 
collection is close to its potential. 
In addition, the Gupta (2007) study of 105 developing countries has reached the 
same results as Chambas & Brun (2010) for the sign of the agricultural sector and 
the import rate on GDP. Moreover, the author has shown that certain structural 
factors such as GDP per capita, foreign aid have a positive effect on the ratio of 
government revenue. However, in most specifications, variables measuring 
political stability, corruption and those describing tax policy have no impact on the 
ratio of taxes to GDP. In addition, the study indicated that in several sub-Saharan 
African countries the level of recipe collection is above potential, unlike some 
Latin American countries where it is below potential. 
Bird, Vasquezi, & Torgler (2014) also attempted to extend the simple model of 
tax effort by showing that not only factors such as the relative share of the non-
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agricultural sector in the economy or the weight of imports and exports in GDP, 
but also that other parameters such as government efficiency, political stability, 
absence of violence, law enforcement and corruption control act positively on the 
level of revenue collected. 
Senou (2014) analyzed Benin's fiscal potential using a stochastic frontier model. 
This method is similar to the first one except that it breaks down the error term into 
two independent components. The first error term is assumed to follow a normal 
centered law, while the second follows a strictly postive normal law. He showed 
that structural factors such as the degree of openness of the economy and real GDP 
per capita determine a tax burden that is still below the fiscal potential. This tax 
potential is not exploited optimally. In other words, Benin is unable to mobilize 
satisfactorily its potential for fiscal resources. 
Diagne & Ba (2016) evaluated Senegal's fiscal potential from a stochastic 
efficiency frontier model, using a tax line approach. They showed that the margin 
of increase in tax revenue as a percentage of GDP was estimated at 2.8 points, 
representing a fiscal potential of 22.4% of GDP. In addition, VAT has the highest 
deviation from potential, ie 0.9 percentage points. On the other hand, the most 
efficient tax line corresponds to the customs duties on petroleum products for 
which the margin of increase is estimated at 0.1 percentage point. 
 
4. Econometric analysis of the determinants of the fiscal 
potential in Morocco 
Drawing on all of the above work, our approach is to explain the tax potential 
by taking into account effective tax revenue rates and the concept of tax effort. 
 
4.1. Measurement and evolution of the effective tax levy rate in Morocco 
In order to make homogeneous comparisons over time or between countries, we 
use as an indicator of fiscal resources the rate of fiscal levy in relation to the gross 
domestic product. It is preferable to retain the gross domestic product (rather than 
the gross national product), which includes all income obtained domestically and 
therefore liable to be taxed, and which excludes transfers from migrant workers, for 
the most part not taxed (Brun et al., 2006). 
The series of GDP that we worked with is the last published by the HCP (2007 
chained price). A retropolation1 correction of the 1980 base series is necessary in 
order to complete the series over the 1990-2015 study period. The correction 
consists of calculating the GDP values before 2007, applying the following 
formula:   
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃07
𝑡−1 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃07
𝑡 ∗ (
𝐺𝐷𝑃80
𝑡−1
𝐺𝐷𝑃80
𝑡 )                                    (1) 
And for tax revenues we have relied on data published by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. 
Graph 1 shows a trend increase in the tax levy rate. Over the period 1990-2015, 
the average rate is 20%. In 2008, a year of strong growth, tax revenues reached 
their typical value (26%) of GDP. 
 
 
1 The basic changes are to improve the national accounts and to better adapt to the needs of analysis. 
On the other hand, they have the disadvantage of causing breaks in the series of accounts. 
Nevertheless, in order to remedy this situation and to have homogeneous series long in time, the 
accounts of the past should be elaborated with reference to the new base year. The various 
procedures used to recalculate the old accounts are referred to as the "retropolation of national 
accounts" from previous bases on the basis currently in force. 
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Graph 1. Evolution of the tax levy rate in Morocco (1990-2015) 
 
Compared to many developing countries and despite relatively strong economic 
shocks (droughts, oil shocks), the tax burden in Morocco is characterized, during 
the period 1990-2015, by less instability, which is a favorable factor for good 
management of public finances. 
 
4.2. Presentation of the structural factors of the fiscal potential 
The tax potential or structural levy rate depends on the amount of income in the 
economy and the structure of that income or, more generally, the structure of the 
economy. These variables evolve slowly and can therefore be considered as 
"structural" factors. These factors can be grouped into several categories according 
to their nature. For each of these categories, we present the theoretical arguments 
suggesting an impact on the public levy and the expected relationships. 
4.2.1. Level of development and public levy 
The most commonly used structural variable is the income level, measured by 
GDP per capita (PIBHAB), which is also an approximation of the level of 
development of the economy. It is reasonable to assume that the higher a country's 
level of development, the higher its capacity to raise resources (in proportion to its 
income). Several explanations can be put forward (Brun, Chambas, & Guérineau, 
2007). On the demand side, the rise in the level of development leads to an increase 
and diversification of the demand for public goods that can reduce taxpayers' 
resistance to taxation (tax compliance). Among the higher goods (that is, whose 
demand increases more than proportionally to that of income), we find, in 
particular, health and education, which are to a large extent public goods. On the 
supply side, a rise in the level of development certainly increases the contributive 
capacity of the economy. In addition, the administrative capacity, especially with a 
view to raising taxes, is probably improving with the level of development, thanks 
in particular to the existence of economies of scale in the financial administrations 
and to a better environment (infrastructure of quality, qualification of government 
employees, level of education of the general population). A positive relationship is 
then expected.  
4.2.2. Product structure and public levy 
For a given level of development, the fiscal potential is naturally different 
according to the characteristics of this economy. It depends in particular on the 
structure of production (agricultural sector, industrial sector, etc.), the degree of 
monetarization of the economy and trade openness (Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 
1997). In fact, the different types of income are more or less easy to tax. 
The agricultural sector is difficult to impose due to the predominance of 
subsistence activities and often dispersed production units with low unit production 
(Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997). The costs of implementing and controlling a tax 
on these activities would be very high and the expected gains low (Ghura, 1998; 
Brun, Chambas, & Guérineau, 2007). We can therefore anticipate a negative 
relationship between tax revenues and the share of agriculture in the economy 
(measured by the share of agricultural value added in GDP, VAAGR). On the other 
hand, industrial activities offer opportunities for tax revenue and we can therefore 
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anticipate a positive relationship between the importance of industrial resources 
and the level of public resources. Their importance is measured by the share of 
industrial value added in GDP (VAIND). Economic transactions that do not result 
in a currency exchange are inherently more difficult to tax. We can therefore 
expect a positive relationship between the degree of monetarization of an economy 
(measured by the ratio between M2 aggregate and GDP, M2) and the capacity of 
the state to raise resources. The share of agricultural value added in GDP, the share 
of industrial value added in GDP and the degree of monetarization of the economy 
are also indicators of economic development, and these variables are generally 
correlated. Their simultaneous inclusion with GDP per capita captures the 
structural effects for a given level of GDP per capita (Brun, Chambas, & 
Guérineau, 2007).  
Finally, the rate of levy is certainly influenced positively by the rate of trade 
opening (OUV) (Brun, Chambas, & Guérineau, 2007). In fact, income from 
international trade is a more taxable base than income or domestic consumption. In 
addition, an increase in the rate of openness of the economy generally leads to 
increased income volatility (Rodrik 1998; Brun, Chambas, & Guérineau, 2007). 
This can result in increased demand for taxpayer insurance resulting in higher 
availability to pay. Table 1 presents the description of the variables of the equation. 
 
Table 1. Variable Dictionary 
Variables Definition Formula/values Data source 
TAX Tax levy rate Log (Tax revenues/GDP) WDI 
PIBHAB GDP Per capita Log (GDP/capita) WDI 
VAAGR Share of value added of the agricultural sector in the GDP Log (agricultural VA/GDP) WDI 
VAIND Share of value added of the industrial sector in the GDP Log (industrial VA/GDP) WDI 
M2 Ratio M2 and GDP Log (Aggregate M2/GDP) WDI 
OUV Trade opening rate Log((export+import)/GDP) WDI 
 
5. Analysis and discussion of the results of the estimates 
Since the decomposition of actual resources, between potential component and 
effort component, is based on an econometric method based on econometric 
estimates, the sampling rate has been regressed only on its structural determinants. 
And for estimation purposes, and to avoid biased results, the introduction of 
logarithm to all variables allows us to homogenize the database, since all variables 
are in ratio and GDP per capita is in value. The sample of countries on which the 
assessment was made includes 25 countries2 including Morocco. It brings together 
countries from Africa, Asia, South and North America and South-East Europe. The 
choice of the sample is also conditioned by the availability of the data. Some 
countries are competing countries and the others are leading countries in the 
category of emerging countries, so they are a reference in the medium and long 
term. For each country, observations are available for a period of 26 years (1990-
2015). The data are organized, then, in the form of a country-years panel.  
It should be noted that the results of the estimates presented in Table-2 are 
obtained using the Eviews econometric software (Appendix 1). 
 
Table 2. Results of the estimate of the fiscal potential 
Explanatory variables Coefficients t-student p-value 
Constant 1.651273 9.530145 0.0000 
PIBHAB 0.015684 2.351247 0.1346 
OUV 0.201853 6.168512 0.0000 
VAAG -0.074791 -2.561247 0.0152 
VAIND 0.146921 4.466914 0.0000 
M2 0.128019 4.997245 0.0000 
R²= 0,66       R² adjusted= 0,63 
Source: Results of the econometric estimation. 
 
2 The sample includes: Algéria, Argentina, Arménia, Bénin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, 
Républic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, India, Indonésia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Roumania, Senegal, Sudan, Togo and Turkey. 
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The results3 show that the model is globally satisfactory. The student statistics 
are largely significant and the signs of the coefficients confirm the theoretical 
underpinning, explaining the impact of each structural variable introduced in the 
model on the tax potential. 
According to the results, the income level is systematically included among the 
determinants of the sampling rate. It has a generally positive and significant 
impact. In other words, the tax rate increases by 0.01% if GDP per capita increases 
by 1%. Similarly, the degree of openness has a positive and significant effect on 
the tax rate. More specifically, a 1% increase in the opening rate results in a 0.2% 
increase in the tax levy rate. The share of the added industrial VA also has a 
positive and significant impact, the levy rate increases by 0.15% if this share 
increases by 1%. 
The effect of the M2 share in GDP on the tax rate is also significantly positive. 
The importance of the degree of monetarization of the economy has the effect of 
stimulating the creation of taxable wealth. 
On the other hand, our panel confirms the negative and significant impact on the 
tax levy rate of the importance of the agricultural sector. Agriculture, which is still 
largely in the informal sector, largely escapes taxation. 
From the estimation results, we can deduce the fiscal potential, by replacing the 
coefficients obtained in the estimated equation, which is deducted from the 
effective tax rate to determine the tax effort. 
The tax effort can be deduced as being the residue of the fiscal potential 
equation. Let "o" be the effective withdrawal rate, "s" the structural levy rate (or 
contributory capacity). We can then write:    
 
𝑂 = 𝑆 + 𝜀                                                                                                                (2)   
 
With "ε" the residual part remained unexplained by the structural factors: 
                                                                                                                                               
𝜀 = 𝑜 − 𝑠                                                                                  (3) 
 
By construction, for all the countries in the sample selected, the average residue 
being zero; so the tax effort must be interpreted in a relative way. The reference 
standard (zero tax effort) corresponds to the average behavior of all the countries in 
the sample. In other words, a zero tax effort (zero residue) characterizes a country 
whose effectiveness of tax mobilization policy is in line with the average of the 
countries in the sample. A negative residual means that the country under 
consideration makes a lower than average tax effort and vice versa when the 
residual is positive. A situation of zero fiscal effort therefore signals, not a faulty 
fiscal policy, but a tax mobilization policy with an efficiency similar to the average 
of the panel. 
As the interpretation of the tax effort is relative, the calculation of this tax effort 
for the whole of the country as well as its average is indispensable. Table-3 
presents the result of this calculation. 
 
Table 3. Tax effort (on average) of different countries in the sample  
Countries Calculated effort (on average) effort /sapmle mean 
Algéria 11,12 11,04 
Argentina 3,44 3,36 
Arménia -2,72 -2,8 
Bénin -4,71 -4,79 
Bolivia 5,76 5,68 
Burkina. Faso -2,2 -2,28 
Chile -0,41 -0,49 
 
3 Two estimation methods were applied: the fixed effects method and the random effects method. The 
one chosen according to the haussman tets has random effects, we accept H0 (random). In other 
words, some of the heterogeneity is part of the tax effort. 
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Countries Calculated effort (on average) effort /sapmle mean 
Colombia 1,37 1,29 
Republic of Congo 8,4 8,32 
Gabon 3,65 3,57 
Guinea -6,11 -6,19 
India -3,86 -3,94 
Indonésia -7,35 -7,43 
Jordan 6,39 6,31 
Malaysia -0,01 -0,09 
Mexico -2,57 -2,65 
Morocco 1,06 0,98 
Pakistan -8,46 -8,54 
Paraguay -0,17 -0,25 
Philippines -4,8 -4,88 
Roumania 8,6 8,52 
Senegal -0,11 -0,19 
Sudan -6,36 -6,44 
Togo -5,62 -5,7 
Turkey 7,55 7,47 
Average 0,08 0 
Source: Author's calculation. 
 
Countries that have a positive fiscal effort, including Morocco, have difficulty 
raising additional tax revenues, compared to the sample, while those with a 
negative fiscal effort have not exploited their space fiscal resources. 
 The evolution of the fiscal effort in Morocco (Graph-2), over the period 1990-
2015, shows two important phases: Before 2005, the tax effort was negative (-1.12 
on average). This means that the tax potential exceeds the effective levy level. The 
consequences of such an overrun on the economy are well known in terms of tax 
evasion and fraud, economic efficiency, loss of household welfare and poverty. 
Although the tax creates distortions in prices, it remains a means of regulation and 
public intervention. 
On the other hand, since 2005, the year of tax reform, this effort has become 
positive (+3.86 on average). In other words, the reform has improved the 
mobilization of actual resources in relation to the fiscal potential. In this case, it can 
be said that Morocco has implemented effective economic policies, in comparison 
to the ones applied by the countries in the sample. 
 
 
Graph 2. Evolution of Morocco's tax effort compared to the sample mean (1990 to 2015) 
 
6. Conclusion  
This article has examined the determinants of fiscal potential for a sample of 
countries including Morocco. The exercise required the estimation of a panel 
model (25 countries-26 years). The model explained the effect of the structure of 
the economy on the tax levy rate. The results showed the positive and significant 
impact of the level of development measured by GDP per capita, the degree of 
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openness, the share of industrial VA and the degree of monetarization. However, 
the share of agricultural VA had a significant but negative impact. 
The deduction of the tax effort, as being the difference between the actual tax 
rate and the tax potential, gave, in the case of Morocco, a negative effort before 
2005 and then a positive one up to 2015. In other words, the country had a fiscal 
effort below the sample average, but the 2005 reform was able to reinforce the 
effective levy to a level that exceeded its potential. This means that the policies 
pursued have allowed efficient resource mobilization in comparison with the 
sample standard. 
Improving tax resources both in terms of their level and their structure requires 
tax reform measures; in this area, a consensus has been established in recent years 
by Morocco. However, in view of the existing consensus, it seems appropriate to 
focus on the key points remaining in the debate such as the definition of institutions 
and a political economy favorable to reform, the degree of economic neutrality of 
VAT, the effectiveness of measures aimed at the taxation of unregistered activities, 
the desirability of taxation of agricultural activities, the rationalization of tax 
exemptions and benefits. 
These various measures will have to be well accompanied by a stabilization of 
the macroeconomic framework in view of a sustainable progress of the level of 
public levy. 
Strengthening domestic resource mobilization is not just about raising revenues: 
it also means designing a levy system that promotes cohesion and good 
governance, improving the capacity of governments to report on their decisions to 
the citizens and to promote social justice. The design and operation of the levy 
system, and in particular the dimensions of transparency, the fight against 
corruption and equity, are also decisive factors for the decisions of national and 
international investors as they constitute improving overall conditions that can 
attract more private investment. 
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Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PPUB)   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 07/18/17   Time: 20:01   
Sample: 1990 2015 
Period included: 26   
Cross-sections included: 25   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 650  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PIB 0.000487 9.26E-05 5.266426 0.0000 
OUV 0.041654 0.006903 6.034100 0.0000 
X 0.559406 0.064020 8.737940 0.0000 
M2 0.153618 0.060759 2.528307 0.0128 
VA -0.032143 0.010554 -3.045439 0.0029 
C 12.70481 1.001946 12.68013 0.0000 
 Effects Specification    
Cross-section random S.D. / Rho 7.29E-07 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random S.D. / Rho 1.878218 1.0000 
 Weighted Statistics    
R-squared 0.330603     Mean dependent var 19.93637  
Adjusted R-squared 0.302712     S.D. dependent var 3.587225  
S.E. of regression 2.995469     Sum squared resid 1076.740 
F-statistic 11.85318     Durbin-Watson stat 0.262156 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted Statistics    
R-squared 0.330603     Mean dependent var 19.93637  
Sum squared resid 1076.740     Durbin-Watson stat 0.262156  
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